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TERRORISM TRIALS IN ARTICLE III COURTS 
LAURA K. DONOHUE* 
Some individuals reject Article III courts as a forum for bring-
ing terrorist suspects to justice on the grounds that the ordinary 
judicial system cannot handle such cases.1 As an empirical matter, 
this claim is simply false. Since 2001, myriad terrorism trials have 
progressed through the criminal system.2 The U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) reports that between 2001 and 2010, there were 998 
defendants indicted in terrorism prosecutions.3 Eighty-seven per-
cent of the defendants were convicted on at least one charge.4 Ac-
cording to the Executive Office for the U.S. Attorneys, from FY 
2004 to FY 2009, there were 3,010 terrorism prosecutions.5 It re-
ported 2,663 terrorism convictions during the same time period.6 
What these numbers demonstrate (reporting inconsistencies not-
                                                                                                                                         
 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This essay was adapted 
from remarks given at the 2014 Federalist Society Annual Student Symposium at 
the University of Florida in Gainesville, Florida. 
 1. Benjamin Weiser, Holder, in New York City, Calls Terror Trials Safe, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/nyregion/terror-trial-proves-
civilian-courts-are-safe-holder-says-in-visit-to-manhattan.html [http://perma.cc/ 
N5P6-BDTT] (noting dissension, particularly among members of Congress, about 
Attorney General Holder’s decision to prosecute several terrorism trials in civilian 
court in New York City). 
 2. See generally CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y.U. SCH. L., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT 
CARD: September 11, 2001–September 11, 2010 (2010), available at http:// 
www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/documents/01_TTRC2010Final1.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/KXM9-TS87] (describing the increasing number of terrorism indictments 
and trials progressing through the civilian criminal law system). 
 3. Id. at 4. 
 4. Id. But note that the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General 
has repeatedly found that DOJ overstates terrorism convictions. 
 5. See Who Is a Terrorist?: Government Failure to Define Terrorism Undermines En-
forcement, Puts Civil Liberties at Risk, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARING-
HOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/215/ [http://perma.cc/5D8T-HYB5] 
[hereinafter Who Is a Terrorist?]. 
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE BUDGET CONGRES-
SIONAL SUBMISSION (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011justification/ 
pdf/fy11-usa-justification.pdf [http://perma.cc/W6HF-W69F]. 
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withstanding7) is that Article III courts have routinely, and suc-
cessfully, managed international and domestic terrorist cases.8 
Nevertheless, there are important concerns driving such critiques 
that deserve further scrutiny. 
Today, I will first consider the most common objections to 
pursuing terrorist cases in the ordinary judicial system. The 
arguments fall into five categories: rules of evidence, the prob-
lems created by classification, the right to call and confront 
witnesses, the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
jury, and the right to self-representation. Critics look to these 
areas to suggest that either detention or military commissions 
                                                                                                                                         
 7. In 2009 the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) issued a 
report stating that the criteria used by different federal entities to determine what 
constitutes a terrorism prosecution appears to differ. See Who Is a Terrorist?, supra 
note 5. Comparing the terrorism cases listed by three separate and independent 
agencies (the courts, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and DOJ’s National Security Divi-
sion), TRAC found that there were only 4% of the defendants in common. Id. The 
discrepancy was not explained by emphasis on international versus domestic 
terrorism: when limited to just international terrorism or terrorist-related finance 
(which is tied to international terrorism), TRAC still only found an 8% overlap 
between the lists. Id. DOJ subsequently critiqued the study, suggesting that TRAC 
omitted important information. TRAC responded by refuting DOJ’s claims. See 
TRAC Seeks Retraction From DOJ, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARING-
HOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/219/ [http://perma.cc/37FN-EJXY] 
(last updated Oct. 19, 2009). In 2013 the Office of the Inspector General issued a 
report on the reporting of terrorism statistics, finding that the Executive Office of 
the U.S. Attorneys was continuing to overreport the numbers. OFFICE OF THE IN-
SPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE’S INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER REPORTING OF TERRORISM-RELATED STATIS-
TICS: THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ii (2013) (“We found 
that although EOUSA revised its procedures for gathering, classifying, and re-
porting terrorism-related statistics based on the recommendations from our 2007 
audit, EOUSA’s implementation of the revised procedures was not effective to 
ensure that terrorism-related statistics were reported accurately.”). For additional 
analysis of the patterns of prosecution in terrorism cases, see CTR. ON LAW AND 
SECURITY, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 
2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 (2010), available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/ 
Portals/0/documents/02_TTRCFinalJan142.pdf [http://perma.cc/L5XG-KPKJ]. 
 8. The Criminal Justice System as a Counterterrorism Tool: Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Jan. 26, 2010), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/541 [http://perma.cc/ 
UML8-V5WZ]. For purposes of this Article, I include both foreign and domestic 
terrorism in the general category of terrorist prosecutions. For discussion of the 
distinction and particular emphasis on domestic terrorist organizations and pros-
ecutions see JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42536, THE DOMESTIC 
TERRORIST THREAT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2013), available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42536.pdf [http://perma.cc/YC2K-NV96]. 
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would be a more appropriate way to handle individuals sus-
pected of terrorist activity. 
Second, I would like to suggest that there are risks in sidestep-
ping Article III courts. Lowered standards that mark the alterna-
tive realms impact due process, public perception, and conviction. 
Transferring cases out of the civilian system undermines citizens’ 
rights: namely, the right to participate in the administration of 
justice. The creation of alternative venues creates forum competi-
tion, which may lead to an abrogation of justice. Pursuing cases 
through the military system may also undermine judicial authori-
ty and contribute to a perception of incompetence with regard to 
the criminal system. 
Third, as an empirical matter, many of the claims about the in-
competence of Article III courts do not play out in practice. Here, 
by way of illustration, I will focus on a case currently underway in 
Manhattan, United States v. Abu Ghayth.9 Some procedures (not 
used in this case) offer further ways to address the difficulties en-
demic to terrorist prosecution. While many of the objections can 
be overcome, one—the right to self-representation—proves more 
troublesome. Although it occurs in only a small fraction of cases 
and there are a handful of ways to address it, each of the solutions 
carries consequences. The problem, nevertheless, is not unique to 
the Article III context and thus vitiates not in favor of moving to a 
system of military commissions, but instead a re-examination of 
the issues associated with denying a defendant a right to appear 
pro se and appointment of standby counsel to address the under-
lying purpose of the right itself. 
I. CRITIQUES OF THE ORDINARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Let us begin with the five critiques most commonly articulat-
ed as to why the ordinary criminal justice system is ineffective 
as a means of pursuing terrorist prosecutions. First is the fail-
ure of the criminal rules of evidence to allow for certain kinds 
of information, collected under conditions that differ from 
                                                                                                                                         
 9. No. S14 98 Crim. 1023, 2014 WL 1613197 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2014). Court rec-
ords and the public record all differ at times on the spelling of the defendant in 
this case. For purposes of this Article, I adopt one spelling “Abu Ghayth,” recog-
nizing that at times this means that the spelling will depart from the sources cited, 
which occasionally use the spelling “Abu Ghaith.” 
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those that generally accompany criminal investigations, to be 
allowed. Second is the risk that classified information may be-
come public and endanger U.S. national security. Third is the 
difficulty that attends providing access to witnesses and incor-
porating their testimony in the trial. Fourth is the concern that 
the requirement of a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
jury cannot be met in cases involving terrorist threats. And fifth 
is the difficulty of guaranteeing self-representation to individu-
als posing a national security threat. Due process concerns 
permeate many of the procedural objections. 
A. Rules of Evidence 
The first set of objections centers on rules of evidence. Two 
principal concerns tend to arise in this area: rules preventing 
the introduction of hearsay, and the doctrine regarding the 
voluntariness of confessions and information obtained through 
interrogation.10 These barriers may be difficult to overcome, 
limiting the type of information that can be presented to estab-
lish a defendant’s guilt. 
1. Inadmissibility of Hearsay 
Hearsay is defined under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 
as a statement that (a) “the declarant does not make while testify-
ing at the current trial or hearing” and (b) “a party offers in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”11 
Rule 801 addresses what is (and is not) hearsay for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                         
 10. The rule against hearsay and the right to confront one’s accusers, although 
derived from a common origin, have become distinct areas of the law. See Giles v. 
California, 554 U.S. 353, 365 (2008) (“[i]t seems apparent that the Sixth Amend-
ment’s Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same 
roots.”(quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)); Ashker v. Leapley, 5 F.3d 
1178, 1180 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Confrontation-clause analysis is a separate and distinct 
inquiry that does not necessarily overlap with hearsay analysis.”). See also John C. 
O’Brien, The Hearsay Within Confrontation, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 501. For 
purposes of this Article, I thus treat them as separate considerations, with hearsay 
falling under critiques related to evidence and Confrontation Clause constituting 
a separate category. In addition to hearsay and interrogation-related concerns, 
objections about using foreign intelligence-derived information, obtained in a 
manner that departs from the Fourth Amendment standards governing criminal 
law, may also give cause for concern. For further discussion, see Laura K. 
Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Con-
tent, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015). 
 11. FED. R. EVID. 801.  
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admitting a prior statement as substantive evidence.12 Hearsay is 
not admissible unless specifically allowed by federal statute, rules 
prescribed by the Supreme Court, or the FRE,13 though myriad 
exceptions exist.14 
The argument, for purposes of terrorism prosecution, is that in 
the murky world of intelligence gathering, information that may 
be material to apprehending a terrorist suspect may not rise to the 
level of assuredness required for exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
One exception, for instance, is that information relating to an in-
dividual’s reputation with regard to character may be admitted, 
as may judgments involving personal, family, or general history.15 
What may not be admitted is a statement that an individual is 
rumored to be a member of a gang or engaged in criminal activi-
ty. Such allegations would have to be offered as evidence of a ma-
terial fact, substantiated or made under oath, and subject to chal-
lenge or cross-examination.16 But in the case of international ter-
terrorism, the collection of intelligence leading to apprehension of 
a suspected terrorist may be based solely on allegations from un-
named informants—none of which may be admitted as evidence 
against the accused at trial. 
To some extent, the distinction between the types of infor-
mation obtained in the world of national security versus the realm 
                                                                                                                                         
 12. S.R. NO. 93-1277, at 16–17 (1974), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
rules/fre/rule_801 [http://perma.cc/4DJE-BRVZ]. Prior statements of a witness that 
are inconsistent with their testimony is always admissible for the purpose of im-
peaching the witness’ credibility. More specifically, where the declarant-witness 
has testified and has been subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, 
and the statement (which is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony) was giv-
en under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposi-
tion, or (where consistent with the declarant’s testimony) is offered to rebut or 
express an implied charge, to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility, or to identify 
a person, the statement is not hearsay. Nor is a statement hearsay when it is of-
fered against an opposing party and it was made by the party in an individual or 
representative capacity, is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to 
be true, was made by an individual authorized by the party to make a statement 
on the subject, was made by the party’s agent or employee within the scope of 
that relationship, or was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in further-
ance of the conspiracy. Id. 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 14. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 (allowing, inter alia, for present sense impressions; 
excited utterances; then-existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions; state-
ments made for medical diagnosis or treatment; and recorded recollections). 
 15. FED. R. EVID. 803(21) & (23). 
 16. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 807 (residual exception). 
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of law enforcement is related to the systems’ underlying orienta-
tions. For military matters, associational status may be more im-
portant than actual conduct; the type of information establishing 
the former may be subject to more lenient conditions. In criminal 
law, emphasis on individual action is more important than gen-
eral status (e.g., one acting in the capacity of a terrorist). So there is 
a specificity required, backed by evidence of engagement in the 
activity, that differs from the standards employed in the military 
realm.17 This undergirds the requirement that the prosecution, in 
a criminal trial, establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt of en-
gagement in illegal activity. With these different goals in mind, it 
could be argued, the former provides a more appropriate venue 
to try terrorist offenses than the latter. 
2. Requirement of Voluntariness 
Like the general prohibition against the admission of hear-
say, methods of interrogation in counter-terrorist operations 
may undermine the use of evidence in the ordinary criminal 
system. Once again, the underlying goals of the institutions in 
question matters. 
In police investigations, the goal of interrogation is to figure out 
what happened in relation to a particular crime. In contrast, in the 
world of international terrorist threats, the aim of interrogation 
conducted by the intelligence community or the military is to ob-
tain information that may be useful to prevent acts of terrorism, or 
to provide the United States with a strategic or tactical advantage. 
Different rules apply for the questioning of suspects and the re-
cording of information obtained. Compounding the distinction, in 
the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States departed from previous norms, engaging in coercive inter-
rogation methods. 
What this means is that information obtained from the custodi-
al interrogation of prisoners in the intelligence or military context 
may not be admissible in civilian courts. Since the Founding, the 
Supreme Court has rejected confessions obtained through police 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. For thoughtful discussion of the distinction between conduct and status in 
the military and criminal justice realms, see Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Gold-
smith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 
STANFORD L. REV. 1079 (2008). 
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brutality or torture. 18 Starting in 1936, a series of cases found that 
tactics resulting in involuntary statements violate the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments guarantee to due process of law. The 
Court gradually incorporated more subtle means of eliciting 
statements, such as denial of food or sleep, holding suspects in-
communicado, and exerting psychological pressure as evidence of 
the (in)voluntariness of confessions—all methods employed by 
the military in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks.19 
As a domestic, civilian matter, whether or not a criminal suspect 
conveys accurate information in the statement thereby obtained 
matters little; the point of the prohibition is the nature of the inter-
rogation itself.20 
To limit the potential for involuntary confessions, in 1966, the 
Supreme Court introduced a requirement that law enforcement 
inform suspects of their rights prior to questioning. In Miranda v. 
Arizona,21 the Court considered four different cases involving cus-
todial interrogations, where the defendants had been sequestered 
and no full warning of rights administered prior to interroga-
tion.22 The Court placed special emphasis on the potentially coer-
cive nature of custodial detention, noting that “the prosecution 
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure 
the privilege against self-incrimination.”23 A criminal defendant, 
therefore, “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has 
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used 
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence 
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”24 
                                                                                                                                         
 18. See, e.g., Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1884); Bram v. United States, 168 
U.S. 532, 542 (1897). 
 19. See GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 168–171, 178–79, 180 (2010); Obama 
Statement on Release of Torture Memos, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2009, available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/04/16/obama-statement-on-release-of-torture-
memos/ [http://perma.cc/VU28-M9PT]. 
 20. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543 (1960). 
 21. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 22. Id. at 440. 
 23. Id. at 444. By custodial interrogation, the Court meant any “questioning ini-
tiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. 
 24. Id. 
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The argument against using ordinary criminal courts notes that 
individuals suspected of terrorist activity, who are apprehended 
abroad by the intelligence agencies or by the military, are typically 
not informed of their rights prior to the initiation of questioning. 
The situations in which individuals are being held may be chaotic, 
the questions put may relate to immediate threats, and those who 
are conducting the interviews are not police officers. 
While there is a “public safety” exception to Miranda that is 
triggered when the police have an objectively reasonable belief 
that extraordinary steps are required to protect the police or the 
public from immediate danger,25 a prior awareness of particular 
facts or circumstances giving rise to the imminent concern pro-
vides a baseline.26 It may not always be the case, however, at the 
time at which a terrorism suspect is apprehended abroad, that the 
officers interrogating the individual have enough information to 
meet this standard. In 1984 the Supreme Court further made it 
clear that the only questions that could be put to an individual in 
custodial detention under the public safety exception were those 
necessary for law enforcement “to secure their own safety or the 
safety of the public.”27 
In some terrorist cases, of course, this standard may be met. In 
United States v. Khalil, for instance, the New York Police Depart-
ment raided an apartment after obtaining information that indi-
viduals living inside had built, and were planning to detonate, a 
bomb.28 When police entered the apartment, one of the suspects 
grabbed a police officer’s gun while another tried to reach a black 
bag believed to be holding an explosive device.29 Having subdued 
the occupants, the police opened the bag and saw pipe bombs, 
one of which had the detonator switch flipped. 30 The police went 
to the hospital to question one of the suspects, who told officers, 
inter alia, how many bombs there were, how many switches were 
on each bomb, and which wires should be cut to disarm them.31 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the de-
                                                                                                                                         
 25. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 659 (1984). 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 27. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659. 
 28. United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 29. Id. at 115–16. 
 30. Id. at 116. 
 31. Id. 
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fendant’s efforts to suppress his statements on the grounds that 
the queries put to the suspect clearly fell within the public safety 
exception.32 
Not all questions put by the intelligence community to terrorist 
suspects, however, may fall within the public safety exception. 
Information that may be germane to U.S. national security may 
lead to information that ultimately results in criminal prosecution. 
One argument against using civilian trials therefore focuses on the 
limits that would otherwise be placed on the intelligence commu-
nity’s ability to identify threats to the country, should terrorism 
prosecution be limited to the criminal realm. 
B. Role of Classification 
The second major objection to Article III trials has to do with 
the role of classification, and particularly the damage to national 
security that would be caused if classified materials were to enter 
the public domain. The objection has two aspects: what is seen 
and who sees it. 
In 1980 Congress addressed the first aspect through the Clas-
sified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).33 The statute sought 
to address the problem of “graymail,” where criminal defend-
ants threatened to disclose classified information during the 
course of a trial, forcing the government to abandon prosecu-
tion altogether. The statute is purely procedural: it outlines 
steps to be taken to prevent the unnecessary or inadvertent dis-
closure of classified information, while making the impact of 
continuing the trial transparent. It provides for pretrial confer-
ence, the use of protective orders, the manner in which the de-
fendant may discover classified information, and notice of the 
intent to use classified information. I will return to CIPA and 
how it works in practice in a moment. 
The second aspect of classified material that generates concern 
about using the ordinary judicial system is who has access to the 
information. This issue does not affect the courts directly. Article 
III judges automatically have security clearances.34 The federal 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. Id. at 115.  
 33. Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), Pub. L. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, 
(Oct. 15, 1980). 
 34. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, NATIONAL SECURITY 
CASE MANAGEMENT: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE 7 (2011). Magistrate judges, in con-
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judiciary, moreover, has a Litigation Security Group to facilitate 
security clearances for court staff (judges who deal with a great 
number of classified cases usually require clerks to obtain a secu-
rity clearance).35 Prosecutors often have clearances as well.36 
The real question is how to make the necessary information 
available to the defense to ensure a fair trial. Regular criminal de-
fense attorneys rarely, if ever, have security clearances. The dan-
gers associated with granting them clearances may be significant. 
Civilian defense attorneys may be unfamiliar with the threats that 
result from information being revealed. They (and their families) 
may be put at great personal risk by being given access. Beyond 
this, attorneys may themselves be linked to organizations seeking 
access to classified information. So even if the court allows the 
defense team to see information that is not made public, there is 
an additional national security risk in expanding the number of 
people who have access to the information. 
Relatedly, there is concern about not being able to make use 
of classified materials and the impact that this would have on 
the United States’ ability to pursue justice. Where the govern-
ment may be prevented from revealing information material to 
the defense, the only alternative may be to drop prosecution 
altogether. This is not dissimilar to the situation that gave rise 
to CIPA in the first place. In the realm of national security, the 
costs of allowing an individual engaged in terrorist activity to 
be released, however, may be particularly high, with devastat-
ing consequences for the life and property of U.S. citizens and 
the governance of the country itself. 
Between these bookends are myriad questions relating to par-
ticular pieces of information and the extent to which they can be 
revealed without, in mosaic fashion, providing enough detail to 
create new vulnerabilities for the United States and its citizens. 
C. Right to Call and Confront Witnesses 
The third set of objections relate to the constitutional right to 
call and confront witnesses. The Sixth Amendment provides that 
                                                                                                                                         
trast, do not automatically have a clearance, althoughthe process to obtain a clear-
ance usually takes a matter of days due to the rigors involved in becoming a mag-
istrate judge in the first place. 
 35. Id. at 8. 
 36. Id. 
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“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him [and] to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”37 
The Supreme Court understands the Confrontation Clause, 
derived from the same origin as the common law rule against 
the admission of hearsay, to ensure that the defendant has an 
opportunity to challenge the credibility of anyone testifying in 
opposition, and to cross-examine the individual making the 
statements. While exceptions to hearsay exist, in 2004 the Su-
preme Court recognized that testimonial statements made out-
side the courtroom are inadmissible where the accused has not 
had the opportunity to cross-examine the individual and the 
person is not available at trial.38 
In the terrorism context, one concern centers on access to de-
tainees. That is, the government may have an individual in custo-
dy who has provided information material to the prosecution. In 
order to use this information at trial, the defendant must be pro-
vided with an opportunity to challenge the information through 
cross-examination. The government, however, may be concerned 
about allowing the defendant to contact individuals being held 
for terrorist offenses. Detainees may use the opportunity to send 
messages to others in their organization. They may take the op-
portunity to manipulate the media. They may use it to develop 
strategies with others similarly situated. 
To the extent that the government refuses access to a detain-
ee, the Compulsory Process Clause, which gives every criminal 
defendant the right to call witnesses in their favor, may also 
come into play. That is, the defendant may want to contact a 
detainee held by the government to obtain exculpatory state-
ments.39 The defendant may want the individual to testify in 
their defense at trial. The same concerns, however, that mark 
giving a defendant direct access to a detainee—and to the me-
dia and the public through the civilian judicial system—may 
accompany allowing a detainee to testify in court. Information 
                                                                                                                                         
 37. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
 38. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 39 . See, e.g., Jerry Markon, Lawyers Want Detainees to Testify in Terror Trial, 
WASH. POST, July 15, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2008/07/14/AR2008071401446.html [http://perma.cc/RRV4-FVXU]. 
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may be conveyed in the process to individuals who present a 
threat to the United States and its people. 
The Confrontation Clause extends to physical evidence as well. 
The jury must have an opportunity to view the physical evidence, 
and the defense must have an opportunity to cross-examine the 
meaning and validity of the evidence presented. For evidence ob-
tained overseas, held overseas, or destroyed in the conduct of mil-
itary operations conducted outside domestic borders, this re-
quirement may be difficult (or impossible) to meet. It may be 
dangerous to bring the evidence into a domestic courtroom. It 
may also create a different type of security risk to do so, providing 
in the process information about weapons and vulnerabilities. 
Additionally, there is a practical consideration: geography. 
Since terrorism is often global and many trials are international, 
proceedings may be complicated by efforts to incorporate the tes-
timony, and allow for the cross-examination of, witnesses located 
outside the United States.40 
D. Right to a Speedy and Public Trial by an Impartial Jury 
The fourth set of objections relates to the conduct of the trial 
itself. Specifically, the Sixth Amendment provides criminal de-
fendants with “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an im-
partial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previous-
ly ascertained by law.”41 Speed, transparency, and impartiality, 
however, may be difficult to guarantee when prosecuting indi-
viduals for terrorist offences. 
Consider first the swiftness of the trial. Unlike criminal law, 
where, as a general matter, individuals are apprehended and cas-
es prepared in rapid sequence, individuals prosecuted for terrorist 
crimes may first be held for intelligence-gathering purposes. Ex-
tended detention, once adopted, thus means a lengthy process.  
Even if we consider the trial process from the point at which 
a suspect is charged, a number of characteristics unique to the 
world of counter-terrorism may draw out the proceedings. 
Classification, and the steps that must be taken to evaluate and 
negotiate the type of information that will be provided, present 
                                                                                                                                         
 40. REAGAN, supra note 34, at 53–54. 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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a formidable challenge. Terrorism cases typically involve nu-
merous agencies, which hold different pieces of the puzzle. In-
formation from the Central Intelligence Agency, the National 
Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National 
Counterterrorism Center, and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion may be relevant, as may military records. The U.S. Attor-
ney’s Office prosecuting the case, as well as the National Secu-
rity Division at the Department of Justice may both be 
involved, as well as local and state law enforcement agencies. 
The Treasury may have a role to play with regard to sanctions 
or charges of material support, even as State Department rec-
ords designating foreign terrorist organizations and their asso-
ciates may be of issue. Further records from the Department of 
Homeland Security may similarly be relevant.  
This elaborate network, spanning departments, must be man-
aged in order for information to be secured and produced for the 
prosecution. This takes time. Added to this are the geographic 
concerns highlighted in the previous section and the difficulty of 
procuring witnesses and evidence from overseas. Together, the 
structure itself of the counter-terrorism bureaucracy may raise 
Sixth Amendment claims in the ordinary judicial system.42 
The right to a public trial is not absolute. Where there is “an 
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that in-
terest,” a judge may close a trial to public access.43 There are times 
when this has been done for cases involving, for instance, orga-
nized crime, trade secrets, or sexual assault of a minor. And there 
are cases in the counterterrorism realm, where courts have sought 
to prevent public access to at least part of the proceedings. But 
there are still a number of concerns that arise. 
The silent witness rule, for instance, is a little-known eviden-
tiary doctrine, wherein the trial participants have copies of a clas-
                                                                                                                                         
 42. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Former Detainee’s Right to Speedy Trial Wasn’t Vio-
lated, Appeals Panel Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
10/25/nyregion/appeals-panel-upholds-conviction-of-ghailani-ex-detainee.html 
[http://perma.cc/U68P-YRXR]. See also Walter E. Kuhn, Crime and Punishment: The 
Modern Development of Homegrown Creative Justice: The Speedy Trial Rights of Mili-
tary Detainees, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 209 (2012). 
 43. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1986). See also 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (holding that the right to a public trial is 
not absolute). 
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sified document providing designated code names for places, 
names, and other information.44 The public does not have access 
to the key. During the trial, reference to classified information is 
made by using the code words or phrases, thus protecting infor-
mation from public disclosure.45 In 2007 the silent witness rule 
(SWR) went into effect for the first time, when Judge T.S. Ellis III 
presented it as effectively closing a trial from the public by creat-
ing two sets of evidence: one available to the public, and the other 
limited to the trial participants.46 Ellis suggested that “SWR is not 
per se impermissible because it closes the trial, but use of the pro-
cedure is permissible only after a searching analysis.”47 Ellis pro-
posed a four-part test commensurate with the Press-Enterprise 
standard48 for partial closure of a trial: the government must es-
tablish “(i) an overriding reason for closing the trial, (ii) that the 
closure is no broader than necessary to protect that interest, (iii) 
that no reasonable alternatives exist to closure, and (iv) that the 
use of the SWR provides defendants with substantially the same 
ability to make their defense as full public disclosure of the evi-
dence, presented without the use of codes.”49 While the silent wit-
ness rule appears to address concerns about classified information 
entering the public domain, its use is highly controversial,50 and 
efforts to employ it have been unsuccessful.51 
                                                                                                                                         
 44. Jonathan M. Lamb, The Muted Rise of the Silent Witness Rule in National Securi-
ty Litigation: The Eastern District of Virginia’s Answer to the Fight Over Classified In-
formation at Trial, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 213, 217 (2009). 
 45. Id. 
 46. United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 797 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“[U]se of the 
SWR constitutes a partial closure of the trial or, if used extensively, a complete closure 
of the trial because it prevents the public from seeing and hearing the complete body 
of evidence in the case.”). The procedure differs from CIPA in that the information is 
never be made available to the public. Id. See also United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 
2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006); Steven Aftergood, AIPAC Court Considers “Silent Witness” Pro-
cedure, SECRECY NEWS (Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/ 
2007/03/aipac_court_considers_silent_w/ [http://perma.cc/PC4F-KMAK]; Steven Af-
tergood, AIPAC Court Adopts Silent Witness Rule, SECRECY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2007), 
available at http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2007/11/aipac_court_adopts_silent_witn/ 
[http://perma.cc/QNF5-7GYS]. 
 47. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 797. 
 48. Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510. 
 49. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 799. 
 50. See, e.g., Jesselyn Radack, Constitutionally-Questionable “Silent Witness Rule” 
Approved for Espionage Act Prosecution, DAILY KOS (Oct. 4, 2011, 8:13 AM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/10/04/1022669/-Constitutionally-
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The final consideration with regard to conduct of the trial re-
lates to the role of the jury. Here, twin issues arise: the potential 
threat of violence to the jurors, and the risk of partial juror behav-
ior, as linked to the emotive nature of terrorist activity. 
On the former, terrorist threats raise concern about the impact 
of violence—and the threat of violence—on the judicial process. 
Civilian jurors may be particularly vulnerable to threatening be-
havior.52 They typically are drawn from a cross-section of the pub-
lic and, as such, (unlike soldiers, for instance), are not deeply em-
bedded in a protective sphere. Especially in a digital age, details 
about their lives (and those of their families and relatives) may be 
easily discoverable.53 In contrast, military personnel—and, partic-
ularly, judges in the military system—are by nature fewer in 
number and by circumstance, more protected from and less vul-
nerable to efforts at intimidation. 54 
The second concern centers on the impartiality requirement 
and the possibility of juror bias in terrorism cases. Individuals 
selected for service may exhibit strong leanings either toward 
or away from the accused, depending on the juror’s view of 
government actions, or perception of potential links between 
                                                                                                                                         
Questionable-Silent-Witness-Rule-Approved-For-Espionage-Act-Prosecution# 
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and American Criminal Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2007). 
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Time, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 611, 611 (2012). 
 54. In the United Kingdom, the risk of juror intimidation in terrorism trials has 
been dealt with by suspending the use of juries. See Donohue, supra note 52, at 1322. 
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the individual and illegal organizations.55 Cognitive bias, i.e., 
patterns in judgment that derive from individuals’ subjective 
experience of the world, may play a critical role.56 Juror procliv-
ity may be particularly pronounced in situations involving an-
ger, violence, and injustice and it may lead to perceptual distor-
tion and inaccurate judgments.57 
E. Right to Self-Representation 
The fifth and final objection relates to the right to self-
representation. In 1975 the Supreme Court recognized the right 
to appear pro se as protected by the Sixth Amendment.58 The 
right, once knowingly and intelligently invoked, is guaranteed—
even where its exercise may be detrimental to the defendant.59 In 
1984 the Supreme Court established the central elements of this 
so-called “Faretta right” in McKaskle v. Wiggins.60 The trial court 
appointed counsel over the defendant’s objection, leading the 
Supreme Court to hold that the appointment of standby counsel 
did not violate the right to self-representation: the defendant 
was still “entitled to preserve actual control over the case he 
chooses to present to the jury.”61 
In the intervening years, much ink has been spilled over the 
tension between this right and the basic concepts of fairness 
that undergird the criminal justice system.62 Not least is the ap-
parent contradiction between the right to appear pro se and the 
right to the assistance of counsel. Indeed, the Faretta Court it-
                                                                                                                                         
 55. Id. at 1322. 
 56. Id. at 1324. 
 57. Id. at 1324–32. 
 58. Faretta v. Calfornia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); see also Martinez v. Court of Appeal 
of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152 (2000). 
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 60. 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
 61. Id. at 178. 
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Represented Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65 CAL. L. REV. 636, 649–51 (1977); Anne 
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self acknowledged that its holding ran somewhat counter to 
the proposition that the assistance of counsel was essential to 
the conduct of a fair trial.63 
A unique way in which this tension presents itself in regard to 
the sufficiency of Article III as a venue for terrorism trials relates 
to the use of classified evidence. It may be impossible to allow ter-
rorists, or individuals accused of terrorist activities, to represent 
themselves and, as a consequence, to have access to classified 
methods, procedures, and information. This information could 
then be passed to terrorist organizations, with potentially dire na-
tional security effects. Even should stand-by counsel be appointed 
by the trial court, Supreme Court doctrine requires that the de-
fendant preserve control—something that would be exceedingly 
difficult to do without providing access to sensitive information. 
II. RISKS INHERENT IN SIDESTEPPING ARTICLE III COURTS 
Critics frequently look to one or more of the foregoing argu-
ments to suggest that Article III courts are not appropriate venues 
for the government to prosecute terrorist suspects.64 Instead, it is 
argued, suspects should either be detained or charged through 
military commissions. Before evaluating the arguments, it is 
worth recognizing that there are a number of risks inherent in not 
pursuing terrorist suspects through the ordinary legal system. 
Lowered standards impact due process, public perception, and 
justice. Movement out of the civilian sphere undermines rights of 
citizenship—particularly the right to participate in the administra-
tion of justice. The creation of an alternative system creates forum 
competition, which may lead to abrogation of justice. Such shifts 
                                                                                                                                         
 63. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832–833. 
 64. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer and Charlie Savage, U.S. Defends Prosecuting Ben-
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may also undermine judicial authority and build a perception of 
incompetence with regard to the judiciary. 
Military commissions have lower standards than those that 
mark the civilian sphere, with significant constitutional and 
rights-based implications.65 Others have written and spoken ele-
gantly and at length about these concerns.66 Beyond the substan-
tive issues, lowered standards affect other countries’ perceptions 
of the United States, and the country’s commitment to the rule of 
law. Selecting a venue based primarily on likelihood of conviction 
rather undermines the enterprise. The decision to leave the ordi-
nary criminal system may thus reverberate in important ways, 
affecting the country’s foreign relations and, ultimately, national 
security, as other countries prove reticent to facilitate U.S. interests 
abroad or to extradite suspects to the United States. Lower stand-
ards may have the further effect of leading to the conviction of 
individuals who are not guilty of the crimes they have been ac-
cused of committing. The reason the protections are built into the 
criminal justice system in the first place is to prevent those inno-
cent of crimes from being found guilty. 
Another consideration that gets rather less attention is that, 
by shifting the trial out of the civilian realm, it prevents U.S. 
citizens from being able to take part in the judicial process. 
There is an important right here that often goes unnoticed: the 
right to see justice done and to participate in the administration 
of justice as a way of redressing the harms perpetrated by indi-
viduals against society. Victims and their families have the 
right to their day in court, and to be part of, and to bear witness 
to, the proceedings. Removing trials from Article III courts de-
prives citizens of their right to seek redress for wrongs inflicted 
on the United States and her people. 
                                                                                                                                         
 65. Brian C. Baldrate, The Supreme Court’s Role in Defining the Jurisdiction of Mili-
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Moving trials to the military sphere also creates forum competi-
tion with Article III venues, with deleterious effects.67 We have 
already seen the negative impact of competition in the public ac-
counting of how cases are doing in Article III courts. Success 
tends to be gauged by the number of convictions, the length of 
sentences, the harshness of the punishments imposed. Dissatisfac-
tion results from the perception that sentencing is not sufficiently 
harsh. Instead of having a conversation about whether the Article 
III venue offered a fairer process, or whether justice was served, 
the conversation becomes focused on which system yields the 
most convictions. This is concerning for rule of law. 
Constant critique of the ordinary system may also undermine 
the judiciary’s belief in its ability to operate effectively in the crim-
inal and civil realms. Consider state secrets. We have seen, in a 
number of cases like Jeppesen and El-Masri, that in order to protect 
classified information, the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit 
have upheld the state secrets claim on the grounds that they are 
not able to handle this information in their courtrooms.68 We have 
seen a similar effect with regard to Bivens suits, such as the Rule 
12 dismissal on a Bivens claim. In the Arar case, national security, 
again, became a special factor. 69 We saw the same thing in Rasul, 
Ali v. Rumsfeld, and other cases.70 In other words, constant ques-
tioning may lead to a sort of disenfranchisement across the board, 
weakening the role of the courts in cases that could (and should) 
otherwise be handled by Article III entities.71 
                                                                                                                                         
 67. But see Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 1415 
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III. EVALUATING THE ARGUMENTS  
AGAINST CIVILIAN COURTS 
With the risks of not pursuing terrorist cases through the ordi-
nary criminal justice system in mind, how persuasive are the ar-
guments put forward in the first place? One way to approach this 
question is to look at the arguments in light of actual cases. Let us 
consider Sulaiman Abu Ghayth, whose trial started in April 2014 
in Manhattan. 72 
It would be difficult to imagine a case more germane to the 
sets of issues raised by post-9/11 prosecutions than that of Abu 
Ghayth, a 48-year-old man who is married to Osama bin Laden’s 
daughter, Fatima. 73  He was brought to the United States in 
2013.74 The fourteenth superseding indictment, which was is-
sued less than a month before the trial was due to start, alleges 
that between May of 2001 and 2002, Abu Ghayth served al 
Qaeda by urging others to take oaths of allegiance to Osama bin 
Laden, by speaking on behalf of or in support of al Qaeda, and 
by warning that attacks similar to September 11 would occur.75 
This would be a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332, which forbids at-
tempt or conspiracy outside the United States against a U.S. na-
tional, with the intent of committing homicide.76 How have the 
arguments put forward to militate against Article III courts 
played out thus far in Abu Ghayth? 
A. Evidentiary Rules 
Based on the court records, it does not appear that the rules re-
garding evidence have presented a particularly insurmountable 
barrier. Granted, questions related to interrogation—either of Abu 
Ghayth or others in custodial detention—may still arise; however, 
the rules against hearsay, as well as the doctrine enforcing the 
voluntariness of confession and related matters, do not appear to 
have made it impossible for the trial to continue. 
                                                                                                                                         
 72. United States v. Abu Ghayth, 2014 WL 1613197 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2014). 
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Abu Ghayth was apprehended overseas and flown back to the 
United States.77 Over the course of the trip, which lasted approxi-
mately 14 hours, questioning was conducted over a period of 11 
to 12 hours.78 The defendant made a motion to suppress custodial 
statements made by him during the flight on the grounds that he 
was not provided with his Miranda warnings, that he did not 
knowingly waive the rights about which the Miranda warnings 
advise, and that his statements, regardless, were not voluntary.79 
The Court found the statements admissible. As the Second 
Circuit previously recognized, the purpose of the Miranda warn-
ing is “to ensure that the person in custody has sufficient 
knowledge of his or her constitutional rights relating to the in-
terrogation and that any waiver of such rights is knowing, intel-
ligence, and voluntary.”80 For a waiver to be freely made, it must 
be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and 
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or decep-
tion . . . [and] made with a full awareness of both the nature of 
the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision 
to abandon it.”81 For this determination, the Court looks to the 
“totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.”82 
Although pre-Miranda custodial statements are generally inad-
missible, in the case of Abu Ghayth, the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation separated public safety questions from the rest of the 
interrogation and then Mirandized the prisoner prior to further 
questioning.83 All subsequent statements on which the govern-
ment relies were made after Abu Ghayth had been given notice 
of his rights and responded that he understood them and would 
answer the agents’ questions.84 At no point did Abu Ghayth 
make a “clear and unambiguous request for a lawyer.”85 
The Court recognized that, Miranda aside, the ultimate test is 
one of voluntariness.86 The Second Circuit has thus directed that 
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the court take account of “all of the circumstances surrounding 
the interrogation to see if police overreaching overcame a sus-
pect’s will and led to an involuntary” statement.87 Relevant cir-
cumstances include characteristics of the individual accused, the 
conditions of the interrogation, and the conduct of the policy.88  
The Court found that Abu Ghayth was treated humanely 
aboard the airplane and provided with medical personnel during 
his interrogation.89 He was told that he could ask for breaks to 
pray, eat, drink, or use the restroom and was provided with wa-
ter, food, prayer time, and an opportunity to stretch, use the re-
stroom, and take a nap.90 
In March 2013 Abu Ghayth’s defense submitted a motion in 
limine to admit his initial statement to law enforcement in full, 
without modification, subject to appropriate limiting instruc-
tions for the jury. In making this request, defense counsel ar-
gued, “The prohibition against hearsay is inoperative. Any po-
tential prejudice to the government is cured through 
appropriate limiting instructions.”91 
According to defense counsel, the manner of interrogation 
did not bar the admission of the information; to the contrary, it 
required full provision of the defendant’s statement. According 
to the FBI, Abu Ghayth stated, “I am willing to tell you any-
thing and will not hold back. I will be honest with you. 
Through your questions, I may have questions.”92 The inter-
view subsequently covered a wide range of topics, ranging 
from Abu Ghayth’s awareness of any current or pending 
threats against the United States, his personal life, family and 
background, and his custody in Iran, to (inter alia) his Miranda 
rights, his views on Osama bin Laden, and speeches he had 
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given.93 Defense counsel noted that Abu Ghayth’s statement to 
law enforcement appeared to be “the only means by which the 
government can prove certain material evidence.”94  Defense 
counsel argued that it would be inappropriate to introduce 
Abu Ghayth’s statement in piecemeal fashion; it therefore 
asked the court to submit his statements in unredacted form.95 
For the defense, the question was ultimately one of fairness. 
Abu Ghayth’s attorneys argued, 
Mr. Abu Ghayth’s right to present a defense must include 
cross-examination on the accuracy, credibility and scope of 
any statement that the government seeks to introduce in rec-
orded or testimonial form. Any assertion within his statement 
is material: where, as here, the government’s proof hinges on 
a defendant’s statement, the jury must be entitled to deliber-
ate on the statement as it was made to law enforcement, with-
out modification. Fairness requires it. Once the government 
elects to question a criminal defendant and then introduces 
his statement against him at trial, the statement becomes an 
issue of fact for the jury.96 
The government objected to the motion on the grounds that the 
request had “absolutely no basis in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
or any other legal authority, and would fly in the face of firmly-
established hearsay rules.”97 The government thus took the posi-
tion that because of the rules governing hearsay—which were “of 
course, very much operative at this trial”—information irrelevant 
to the prosecution should not be allowed.98 Under the Federal 
Rule of Evidence, when provided by the Government, Abu 
Ghayth’s prior statements represented non-hearsay admissions of 
a party opponent.99 Offered by the defendant, however, his own 
statements would qualify as inadmissible hearsay. 100  Self-
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servicing statements made by the defendant in the past and of-
fered by the accused are inadmissible.101 
For the government, the rule of completeness did not change 
this analysis. Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides, 
“[i]f a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded state-
ment, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, 
of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—
that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.”102 Re-
sultantly, although a statement may be hearsay, it may be includ-
ed where necessary to explain the portion admitted to the record, 
to put it in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure that 
the admitted portion if fairly and impartially understood.103 But 
the rule of completeness did not compel the Court to admit of 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay.104 Nor could it become a device 
to bypass hearsay rules regarding self-serving testimony.105 
U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan ultimately denied the defend-
ant’s in limine request. Thus, far from preventing the government 
from bringing prosecution, the hearsay rules seem rather to have 
assisted the government in its prosecution. Nor did the manner of 
interrogation undermine the voluntariness of the statements thus 
obtained. The intelligence community, moreover, was able to ob-
tain a wide range of information in the course of the interrogation, 
much of which was unrelated to the trial itself.106 
                                                                                                                                         
 101. United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55, 73 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 102. FED. R. EVID. 106. 
 103. United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 85 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 104. Government’s Opposition, supra note 91. 
 105. Id. (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 299 F. App’x 641, 645 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 106. Admittedly, in this case, interrogators did not engage in the types of coer-
cive behaviors that mark U.S. actions the immediate aftermath of September 11. 
Here, it is worth noting that regardless of which forum provides the backdrop, the 
exclusion of evidence obtained under coercion or torture, stems from the Consti-
tution. See generally Christopher W. Behan, Everybody Talks: Evaluating the Admissi-
bility of Coercively Obtained Evidence in Trials by Military Commission, 48 WASHBURN 
L.J. 563 (2009). The rules are not a procedural consideration unrelated to underly-
ing rights that can simply be shifted to obtain a higher conviction rate. Instead, the 
doctrine is grounded in fundamental principles upon which the rule of law in the 
United States is based. They thus speak to substantive rights, as well as the risk of 
improper conviction and would be of equal import in either an Article III or a 
non-Article III context. 
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B. Classification 
What about the role of classification? In Abu Ghayth, the ques-
tion of how to handle classified materials has arisen; however, the 
associated issues do not appear to have impeded the case. As one 
goes through the public court record, moreover, there is a tre-
mendous amount of information about how it has been handled, 
suggesting that a certain degree of transparency can still be main-
tained, even when classified material is involved. 
In April 2013, for instance, the judge issued a protective order 
pertaining to classified information pursuant to the CIPA.107 The 
order also drew from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
108 Under Rule 16, the government is required to disclose certain 
types of information, including oral statements before or after 
arrest; written and recorded statements within the government’s 
control; the defendant’s prior criminal record; documents and 
objects material to preparing a defense or that the government 
intends to use in case-in-chief at trial; reports of examinations 
and tests; and a written summary of testimony that the govern-
ment intends to use. Under Rule 16D, the court can introduce 
special rules for classified materials to regulate discovery.109 The 
judge may announce protective and modifying orders and con-
sequences for parties’ failure to comply with the orders. 110 Final-
ly, under Rule 57, each district court, after public notice and 
provision of an opportunity to comment, may make or amend 
rules governing its practice.111 
Judge Kaplan determined that the case would involve classified 
materials, that special security precautions would be required (as 
mandated by statute, Executive Order 13526, and regulations), 
and that only those with a need-to-know and the appropriate 
clearance would have access to this material.112 The order estab-
lishes the process that the defense must follow in order to access 
                                                                                                                                         
 107. Protective Order at 1, United States v. Abu Ghayth, 17 F. Supp. 3d 289 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. S14 98 Crim. 1023 (LAK)) [hereinafter Protective Order]; see 
also Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 3, 9. (2012). 
 108. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57. 
 112. Protective Order, supra note 107, at 2. 
130 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 38 
 
this information.113 The order applies to all pretrial, trial, post-trial, 
and appellate matters.114 The judge could further modify the order 
pursuant to the FRCP, CIPA, and the court’s “inherent superviso-
ry authority to ensure a fair and expeditious trial.”115 
Classified information, for purposes of the protective order, in-
cludes anything classified pursuant to Executive Order 13,526.116 
This incorporates not just secret, top-secret, and Sensitive Com-
partmented Information, but also confidential information.117 It 
includes any document in private hands that is derived from clas-
sified information, any document the defense knows or reasona-
bly should know contains classified information, and any foreign 
government information.118 (These types of information are de-
fined in Executive Order 13,526.)119 
There are four elements to the protective order issued by Judge 
Kaplan that help to illustrate the competence of the court in deal-
ing with sensitive material: access to classified information, treat-
ment of material already in the public domain, granting of securi-
ty clearances, and special filing procedures where classified 
information might be involved.120 
1. Access to Classified Information 
According to Judge Kaplan’s order, access to classified infor-
mation at issue in the case can only be done in a Sensitive Com-
partmented Information Facility (SCIF), as accredited by a Classi-
fied Information Security Officer (CISO).121 (The use of a SCIF is 
pro forma: government employees with the appropriate level 
clearances are similarly given access to SCIFs when dealing with 
classified materials.) 
                                                                                                                                         
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 3; see also Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009) 
[hereinafter National Security Information Order].  
 117. Protective Order, supra note 107, at 3. 
 118. Id. at 3–4. 
 119. National Security Information Order, supra note 116, at 707–08. 
 120. Protective Order, supra note 107. 
 121. Id. at 7–10. 
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The order names the primary CISO, as well as the alternates.122 
It requires defense counsel to seek guidance from the CISO re-
garding the appropriate storage, handling, transmittal, and use of 
classified information.123  Any removal of documents from the 
SCIF requires CISO agreement.124 In return, the CISCO is prohib-
ited from revealing to the government the contents of any conver-
sations, the nature of the documents reviewed, or work generated 
by defense counsel. 125 All of the defense counsel’s notes and doc-
uments are retained in the SCIF and prepared on word processing 
equipment provided by the CISO. 126 Defense counsel is only al-
lowed to discuss classified information in the SCIF—not over the 
telephone or Internet, or in front of anyone not holding a CISCO-
granted security clearance.127 
The CISO oversees the security clearance process for the law-
yers engaged in the case.128 In the order, Judge Kaplan specifically 
notes that the defendant (as opposed to defense counsel holding a 
security clearance and having a “need to know”) will not be given 
access to any information, absent (a) leave of the court, or (b) 
without the written permission of the government.129 The judge 
has thus effectively sequestered the defendant from his lawyers, 
who are to be provided with clearances in an expedited manner, 
so as to allow them to assist with Abu Ghayth’s defense. 
2. Material Already in the Public Domain 
The second element to this order is that the material, if it is al-
ready in the public domain but the government has not declassi-
fied it, cannot be used, discussed, or otherwise come up in the 
case, in any form.130 Any documents must be marked “declassi-
fied” by the originating agency or department to remove the ma-
                                                                                                                                         
 122. Id. at 7 (naming Michael P. Macisso as the CISO and Christine E. Gunning, 
Jennifer H. Campbell, Branden M. Forsgren, Daniel O. Hartenstine, Joan B. Ken-
nedy, Maura L. Peterson, Carli V. Rodriguez-Feo, Harry J. Rucker, and W. Scooter 
Slade as alternates). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 10. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 14. 
 127. Id. at 14–15. 
 128. Id. at 8. 
 129. Id. at 9–10. 
 130. Id. at 6. 
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terial from the classification restrictions. 131  The judge further 
notes, “[i]ndividuals who by virtue of this Order or any other 
court order are granted access to classified information may not 
confirm or deny classified information that appears in the public 
domain.”132 Any classified information provided to the defense 
can only be used for preparation of the defense and may not oth-
erwise be disclosed.133 
3. Security Clearance Requirement for Defense Lawyers 
Only cleared government officials have access to classified in-
formation.134 Defense counsel are granted access once the CISO 
gives them a security clearance commensurate with the level of 
material sought, where defense counsel has a “need to know” the 
information in question, and where the attorneys have signed a 
memorandum of understanding agreeing to comply with the 
terms of the order.135 
Defense counsel are required to fill out Standard Form 86, 
the Questionnaire for National Security Positions, as well as 
attached releases, and to submit their fingerprints to the 
CISO.136 The CISO, in turn, is required to “undertake all rea-
sonable steps to process all security clearance applications.”137 
The lawyers for the defendant take part in classified confer-
ences, from which the defendant is excluded. 
                                                                                                                                         
 131. Id. at 6–7. 
 132. Id. at 6. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 8. 
 135. Id. The memorandum of understanding reads: “Having familiarized myself 
with the applicable statutes, regulations, and orders . . . (1) I agree that I shall nev-
er divulge, publish, or reveal either by word, conduct or any other means, such 
classified documents and information unless specifically authorized in writing to 
do so by an authorized representative of the United States Government; or as 
expressly authorized by the Court pursuant to the Classified Information Proce-
dures Act and the Protective Order entered in the case of United States v. Sulaim-
an Abu Ghayth, S13 98 Cr. 1023 (LAK) Southern District of New York. (2) I agree 
that this Memorandum and any other non-disclosure agreement signed by me 
will remain forever binding on me.” Id. 
 136. Protective Order, supra note 107, at 9. 
 137. Id. 
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4. Special Filing Procedures for Classified Information 
There are special filing procedures in place for handling classi-
fied documents. The defendant must file them under seal with the 
CISO, with special markings attached.138 A “Notice of Filing” is 
then entered into the CM/ECF system, notifying the Court that the 
submission has been made.139 The CISO examines the filing to see 
whether classified material is included, marks it appropriately, 
and retains the document under seal.140 The parts of the record 
that are not classified are immediately made public and placed in 
the record.141 The document is then delivered to the Court and the 
Government (unless it is an ex parte filing) under seal. 142 
The government may file only the portions of pleadings or 
documents containing classified information under seal—the rest 
of the document must be made available to the public.143 The 
same rules that govern classified materials filed by the defendant 
apply.144 The CISO maintains a separate sealed record for classi-
fied material. 145  Pretrial conferences involving classified infor-
mation are conducted in camera, with only individuals holding 
clearances and having a need to know in attendance.146 
The judge has provided counsel with an opportunity to file a 
Notice of Intent to Request Redaction for the transcripts (which 
remain under seal).147 For Section 4 CIPA summaries, the judge 
has supplemented the ordinary written record with oral argu-
ment, of which a transcript is kept, sealed, put in a classified envi-
ronment, and kept for appellate review.148 
In addition to the above precautions and procedures, under CI-
PA, the Court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the gov-
ernment to delete information from documents that are going to 
                                                                                                                                         
 138. Id. at 10. 
 139. Id. at 10–11. 
 140. Id. at 11. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 11–12. 
 145. Id. at 12. 
 146. Id. at 13. 
 147. Id at 11, 13. See also Notice of Intent to Request Redaction (form used for 
such purposes), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/file/forms/notice-of-
intent-to-request-redaction [http://perma.cc/FR9F-QQX3]. 
 148. Protective Order, supra note 107, at 12. 
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be made available to the defendant, to substitute a summary of 
the information, or to substitute a statement admitting the rele-
vant facts that classified information would tend to prove.149 Such 
a showing may be made in camera and ex parte.150 If the District 
Court nevertheless orders the disclosure to the defendant of the 
classified information, the order is subject to an immediate and 
expedited interlocutory appeal.151 Together, these procedures 
have given the court the ability to deal with classified infor-
mation, making claims to the contrary somewhat obsolete.152 
C. Compulsory Process and Confrontation 
Abu Ghayth also sheds light on arguments related to compul-
sory process and the right to confront one’s accusers.153 Once 
again, these challenges do not appear to be insurmountable in 
the Article III context. 
Sahim Alwan, who is one of the Lackawanna Six, testified at 
trial. (The Lackawanna Six was a group of six Yemenis from Buf-
falo, New York, who went to training camps in Afghanistan and 
came back.154 Alwan pled guilty in 2003 to providing material 
support to a terrorist organization.155 He then testified at a mili-
tary commission hearing and was released from prison early.156) 
In Abu Ghayth, Alwan stated, for the record, that he saw the de-
fendant in a guest house in Afghanistan discussing bayah (which 
is an Islamic concept of an oath) with Bin Laden, and trying to 
impress upon people what that meant.157 The prosecution played 
                                                                                                                                         
 149. CIPA § 4; 2054 Synopsis of Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), DEPT. 
JUST. CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL, http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_ 
room/usam/title9/crm02054.htm [http://perma.cc/LSS2-9DKK] (last visited Aug. 
13, 2014). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. The defendant must also comply with CIPA § 5. Id. 
 153. See supra Part I. 
 154. DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR: THE LACKAWANNA SIX AND 
ROUGH JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR, xiii–xiv, 45 (2007). 
 155. Id. at 201. 
 156. Christopher M. Matthews, Al Qaeda Trainee Describes Training Camp During 
Terror Trial, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702303824204579423753034928002 [http://perma.cc/ALM8-M76A]. 
 157. Id. 
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al Qaeda videos for the jurors, and Alwan testified that he saw 
Abu Ghayth in one of these videos, talking about the U.S.S. Cole.158 
Not all of the testimony has been so straightforward; never-
theless, the Article III court has been able to construct proce-
dures to ensure that the defendant’s right to confront witnesses 
has been met. As part of his defense, for instance, Abu Ghayth 
requested access to perhaps the most notorious detainee in U.S. 
custody: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Despite government objec-
tions, Judge Kaplan allowed the defendant to depose him while 
he was still being held in Guantánamo Bay.159 He did this by al-
lowing defense counsel to draft questions and then requiring that 
the defense team meet with the government and the judge in con-
ference.160 Once agreed to, the questions were submitted to the 
witness, who responded, with answers returned to defense coun-
sel. 161 This process avoided some of the key objections offered by 
the government, such as interrupting ongoing interrogation pro-
grams, or sending messages.162 
As for the problem of geography, for overseas witnesses, Judge 
Kaplan allowed CCTV to be used, and the court devised a system 
for using technology to allow for witnesses located elsewhere to 
be questioned during the course of the trial.163 
There are other solutions to witness concerns that were not 
used in this case that also offer a way forward. For potential wit-
ness intimidation, for instance, courts may permit individuals to 
testify under pseudonyms, or to use special entrances or exits. 
Light disguises may be worn to ensure that the jurors may still 
assess the witness’s demeanor or indicia of credibility. Court 
sketches may be suppressed. Witnesses may be shielded from 
public view, seen only by the jurors and judge, or remote video 
deposition may occur. Together, these procedures suggest that the 
difficulties presented by Constitutional requirements related to 
compulsory process and confrontation can be accommodated in 
an Article III context. 
                                                                                                                                         
 158. Id. 
 159 . See United States v. Abu Ghayth, S14 98 Crim. 1023 (LAK), 2014 WL 
1613197, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2014). 
 160. Abu Ghayth, 2014 WL 1613197 at *14. 
 161. Id. at *16–17. 
 162. See id. at *14–15. 
 163. Abu Ghayth, 2014 WL 144653 , at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2014). 
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D. Swift and Impartial Trial by a Jury 
In regard to the Constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial, in 
Abu Ghayth, there were, admittedly, some delays.164 It took a 
year to bring the defendant to trial.165 Some of those delays 
were defense-based.166 Some were government-initiated.167 One 
year, however, is not an inordinate amount of time—
particularly in light of the elaborate negotiations with regard to 
classified materials involved. 
With regard to juror selection—and juror intimidation in par-
ticular, selection in the case was anonymous.168 This approach 
helps to protect jurors from coercive behavior, as well as media 
attention. Another way this could be done might be to close the 
voir dire to the public. To accommodate a public right of access, 
judges can release redacted transcripts or allow select media rep-
resentatives to attend. Partial sequester and gag orders may help 
to address juror bias. As for one’s peers, as the court acknowl-
edged in Abu Ghayth, under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, wherever a defend-
ant is brought into the United States, under federal rules, that is 
where they can be tried. Other steps may be taken by the court to 
protect jurors, such as juror disguise, placing jurors behind 
screens, or having only remote viewing of the proceedings. 
E. Self-Representation 
We are left, then, with the final point, which is the right to 
self-representation. As I mentioned at the beginning, this area 
deserves further scrutiny. Abu Ghayth did not appear pro se; 
however, were he to do so, many of the solutions forged by the 
judge to deal with classified materials would flounder, because 
the procedures have relied in large measure on granting clear-
ances to Abu Ghayth’s defense attorneys and on ensuring a 
certain distance between the attorneys and their client. For 
suspects linked to terrorist organization, revealing information 
                                                                                                                                         
 164. See generally United States v. Abu Ghayth, S14 98 Crim. 1023 (LAK), 2014 
WL 144653 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2014). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Jury Selection Continues In Terrorism Trial Of Bin Laden’s Son-In-Law, CBS N.Y. 
(Mar. 4, 2014), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2014/03/04/jury-selection-continues-in-
terrorism-trial-of-bin-ladens-son-in-law/ [http://perma.cc/75A2-YF7Q]. 
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that details vulnerabilities, or sources and methods, can be met 
with significant risks to U.S. persons and property, as well as 
U.S. national security. 
As a matter of criminal law, as aforementioned, there is tension 
between the right to appear pro se and the Sixth Amendment right 
to assistance of counsel.169 That is, if access to counsel is crucial to 
ensuring fairness, then recognizing a right to deny counsel may 
undermine the fairness of the subsequent proceedings. Why, then, 
recognize the underlying right to appear pro se? 
In 1942 Justice Frankfurter addressed the correlation between 
these rights, understanding them as both stemming, in similar 
fashion, from the position of the accused.170 The question was thus 
one of fundamental fairness as informed by the position of the defend-
ant, who must be provided with the ability to present his best de-
fense: “To deny an accused a choice of procedure in circumstanc-
es in which he, though a layman, is capable . . . of making an 
intelligent choice” was to treat Constitutional safeguards as “emp-
ty verbalisms.”171 The Constitution did not require that defend-
ants accept an attorney; it merely provided one, allowing the in-
dividual to decide whether or not to avail himself of someone 
trained in the law. 
Frankfurter’s reasoning in Adams v. United States was dicta; it 
nevertheless remains central to the underlying rationale of why 
the ability to appear pro se is integral to the Constitutional de-
sign. The Supreme Court has thus repeatedly referred to this 
right in support of related holdings. In Carter v. Illinois, for in-
stance, the Supreme Court noted, “Neither the historic concep-
tion of Due Process nor the vitality it derives from progressive 
standards of justice denies a person the right to defend himself . . 
. .“172 In Price v. Johnson, Justice Murphy referred to the defend-
ant’s “recognized privilege of conducting his own defense at tri-
al” as a concomitant of the defendant’s right at the trial stage 
                                                                                                                                         
 169. See, e.g., Maurice M. Garcia, Defense Pro Se, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 551 (1969); 
Joseph D. Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 
MINN. L. REV. 1175 (1970); Mike Riddle, Comment, The Right to Defend Pro Se, 3 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 89 (1971). 
 170. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). 
 171. Id. at 279–80. 
 172. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174 (1946). 
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(albeit distinct from the rights that attach on appeal).173 Later, in 
Moore v. Michigan, the Court noted that while a defendant had a 
constitutional right to counsel at the time of the pleadings, such 
a right could not be used to justify “forcing counsel upon an ac-
cused who wants none.”174 The courts have thus repeatedly, over 
time, recognized the right to one’s self defense, even as it relates 
to broader questions of due process and fairness. 
In McKaskle, the Court came back to Frankfurter’s rationale, 
noting that “[t]he right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity 
and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of 
what may, at least occasionally, be the accused’s best possible de-
fense.”175 Although the Court also noted the importance of allow-
ing a pro se defendant “to control the organization and content of 
his own defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to par-
ticipate in the voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the 
court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial,”176 the pur-
pose of requiring participation at these stages was to help to build 
the best defense possible.177 Assuming that the rationale provided 
by Justice Frankfurter is the correct reading of the right to appear 
pro se, then the questions regarding classification may not be as 
daunting as first appear.  
 The right itself is not absolute. This has been recognized by 
numerous Courts, which, even before Faretta, recognized the 
right to one’s own self defense.178 And there are a number of 
ways in which the right to appear pro se can be augmented by 
                                                                                                                                         
 173. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). 
 174. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957); see also Comment, The Right to Ap-
pear Pro Se: The Constitution and the Courts, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 240 (1973). 
 175. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–177 (1984). The Court continued: “In 
determining whether a defendant’s Faretta rights have been respected, the primary 
focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his 
own way. Faretta itself dealt with the defendant’s affirmative right to participate, 
not with the limits on standby counsel’s additional involvement.” Id. at 177. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Discussion continues as to how to further assist pro se defendants in their 
ability to present the best defense. See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, Ensuring Fairness or 
Just Cluttering Up the Colloquy? Toward Recognition of Pro se Defendants’ Right to Be 
Informed of Available Defenses, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 667 (2013). 
 178. See, e.g., Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971); United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970); Unitd States v. Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165, 1169–70 
(6th Cir. 1969); Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1965); United 
States v. Johnson, 333 F.2d 1004, 1005 (6th Cir. 1964). 
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protections for the defendant. The court, for instance, could ap-
point special defense counsel—e.g., either a government attor-
ney selected for the purpose (and sequestered from the prosecu-
tion), or a private attorney provided with the appropriate 
security clearance179 This approach already has been adopted in 
Article III courts for criminal cases involving terrorist charges.180 
For this process, the court may have to consider whether to 
make an appointment outside the routine selection of lawyers 
pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. A similar action would be 
necessary if counsel for defendants are denied a security clear-
ance or refuse to participate in the process.  
Where a defendant may still insist on proceeding pro se, the 
court can appoint a counsel that has obtained a clearance as a 
backup. Failure to provide counsel of any sort, who could see the 
classified materials, would almost certainly result in a lack of fair-
ness to the defendant in the course of the trial. 
It was precisely concern about the impact of pro se representa-
tion on the fairness of a trial that contributed to Congress’s insist-
ence in the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA) that defend-
ants be provided with counsel.181  Under that statute, military 
defense counsel is detailed to every military commission.182 Coun-
sel must be a judge advocate who has graduated from an accred-
ited law school or is a member of the bar of a Federal court or of 
the highest court of a state, and certified to perform duties as de-
fense counsel before courts-martial by the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the armed force of which he is a member.183 No individual 
who has acted as an investigator, prosecutor, judge, or member of 
a military commission can then be appointed as military defense 
counsel in the same case.184 Article III courts have upheld the 
                                                                                                                                         
 179. For more specific examples of these types of challenges and the various op-
tions courts can use to solve them, see generally ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY CASE STUDIES: SPECIAL CASE-MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES (2013). 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Abdulmutallab, 739 F.3d 891 (6th Cir. 2014) (Ab-
dulmutallab representing himself pro se at the trial stage at which point the court 
appointed standby counsel, and Travis A. Rossman arguing for Abdulmutallab on 
appeal); see also Vickie Thomas, ‘Underwear Bomber’ Case Fizzle – But Why?, CBS 
DETROIT (Oct. 13, 2011, 12:39 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2011/10/13/ 
underwear-bomber-case-fizzles-but-why/ [http://perma.cc/A5SZ-QGVZ]. 
 181. 10 U.S.C. § 948k (2012). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. § 948k(c)(1)–(2). 
 184. Id. § 948k(e). 
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MCA’s statutory requirement even where defendants have pro-
tested the provision of counsel.185 
In civil cases, Congress has provided for a right to appear pro se 
in federal court.186 This right, in similar manner, has been circum-
scribed. For instance, corporations and partnerships must be rep-
resented by counsel; non-attorney parents may not appear on be-
half of their children pro se, outside of efforts to appeal denial of 
social security benefits; and in class action lawsuits, a pro se liti-
gant may not represent the class.187 
Terrorist cases may represent a similar exception to the gen-
eral right, requiring, in the interests of placing the defendant in 
the strongest possible position to present the best defense and, 
thus, to ensure the fairness of the proceedings, that counsel be 
appointed, granted security clearances, and provided with ac-
cess to classified evidence. While this solution is not without 
drawbacks, it would address the underlying concern whence 
the right to appear pro se derives. 
Other steps may be taken to reinforce the purpose for which the 
right to appear pro se is being limited. For instance, it is important 
that such a step is taken early in the proceedings to avoid delays. 
This contributes to the underlying purpose as well: namely, to 
ensure fairness and construction of the best defense possible (and 
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not merely to speed things along).188 Similarly, selection of a new 
attorney may ensure that any previous counsel, which may not 
have been adequately representing the client, do not have an op-
portunity to continue in that capacity. The purpose of having 
standby counsel is not to represent the court’s interest. It is to en-
sure that the defendant has adequate representation, thus con-
tributing in a meaningful way to the fairness of the proceedings. 
Not all terrorism trials may require that a pro se defendant be 
appointed counsel. In 1977, for instance, Marie Haydee Beltran 
Torres, a member of the Fuerzas Armada de Liberacion 
Nacional (FALN), took part in a bombing of the Mobil Oil 
Building in Manhattan.189 Indicted for her role in the attack, 
Torres claimed that U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction over Puerto 
Rico and refused to take any part in her trial or sentencing 
hearing.190 Fifteen years later, the Second Circuit denied Torres’ 
claim that she had been denied her rights as protected by the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. The Court found that 
Torres had knowingly and intelligently waived her Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, that the due process clause had 
not been violated by the absence of mitigating evidence during 
sentencing, and that the sentence of life imprisonment under 
the relevant statute fell short of cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.191  Classified matters 
apparently played zero role in the proceedings. Other exam-
ples from terrorism trials present themselves.192 
Preventing entirely pro se appearances as a general matter car-
ries a risk that reaches to the fundamental right involved. In some 
circumstances, however, appointment of standby counsel, pro-
vided with appropriate clearances, may be warranted.  
As a final note, a significant problem with the pro se critique in 
the context of civilian trials is that it holds equally true for military 
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commissions. That is, it militates neither on the side of civilian 
courts nor on the side of military courts. Either way, it may be 
impossible to honor a defendant’s wishes to proceed pro se when 
classified materials are involved. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The United States has made good use of its Article III courts 
for terrorism cases, and there is every reason to expect that it 
will be able to continue to do so in the future.193 In 2013 the 
Federal Judicial Center put out a 498-page publication on how 
ordinary courts could meet the challenges that accompany na-
tional security cases.194  A companion document summarizes 
case-management principles that judges have found helpful in 
dealing with counterterrorism, espionage, and other programs 
involving government secrecy.195 These documents underscore 
the viability of the criminal justice system. 
Objections to proceeding through Article III courts for matters 
involving terrorism primarily divide into five categories: rules of 
evidence, classified material, the right to confront witnesses, swift 
and public trial, and self-representation.  
One risk of arguing that the ordinary system is inadequate, is 
that cases will be moved to the military system, with substantive 
and international repercussions for U.S. diplomatic relations and 
national security. Citizens may be deprived of their right to take 
part in the execution of justice, even as forum competition fol-
lows, altering the metrics of success. Perceptions of incompetence 
may further erode the judiciary’s effectiveness in other areas.  
Many of the claims regarding the inability of ordinary courts to 
handle terrorism cases, moreover, do not stand up to scrutiny. It 
would be difficult to come up with a more relevant example than 
the case currently underway: United States v. Abu Ghayth. Exami-
nation of the proceedings provides a good illustration of how the 
judiciary may competently handle the challenges involved. One 
area that may, in some circumstances, still prove troublesome is 
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the situation in which a defendant seeks pro se appearance. At 
times, perhaps the only way to ensure fair trial in such circum-
stances will be to assign counsel and to grant such representatives 
access to classified materials. This problem, however, is not 
unique to the Article III context and thus vitiates not in favor of 
military tribunals or indefinite detention, but rather in favor of 
more carefully constructing the requisite procedures to create a 
context in which the strongest defense may be presented. 
